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Arizona is widely recognizedas the most permissive state in the country
for public weaponspossession. In 2010, then-GovernorJan Brewerfamously
removed allpermitting requirementsfor public concealed carry offirearms,
makingArizona only the third "constitutionalcarry" state in the nation. Also
in 2010, and to much less fanfare, Arizona became the first state to prohibit
local governments from enacting any regulations restricting the sale or
possession of knives of any kind, including swords, maces, and other exotic
blades. Today, Arizona remainsthe only state in the country with virtuallyno
restrictionson the public concealed carry of any type of bladedweapon. In
part owing to this deregulatory environment, as many as six percent of all
Arizonans report publicly carrying a concealed deadly weapon on their
person or in their vehicle.'
But these laws have also created confusion for Arizona police officers
chargedwith protectingthe public. Forover a century, Arizona officers could
justifiably initiatean investigatory stop of apublicly armed individual based
on little more than a reasonablesuspicion thatsuch possessionwas unlawful.
But in a state where a significant percentage of the population lawfully
possesses weapons in public, Arizona police must now discern which lethal
weapons carriersare law abidingcitizens and which ones pose true criminal
threats to the public. Increasing the confusion for Arizona law enforcement,
the Ninth Circuit and Arizona Supreme Court have recently authored
conflicting opinions regardingwhether a lawfully stopped individual can be
frisked solely because he is armed or whether he must also give the officer
reasonablesuspicion that he is "presentlydangerous.
This Article examines three distinctaspects ofArizona law andpolicy as
it relates to this growing confusion. First, it challenges the efficacy and
constitutionality of Arizona's "duty to inform" law, which seeks to clarify
this reasonable suspicion quandary by requiring concealed weapons

* Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law;
Criminal Appellate Advocate, Judicial Council of California; former Board Member, Community
Review Board on Police Practices in San Diego; J.D. 2007, Boston University School of Law;
B.A. 2003 in Political Science, Yale University.
1.
Concealed CarryStatistics, GUNS TO CARRY, https://www.gunstocarry.com/concealedcarry-statistics/#info [https://perma.cc/W3K5-J7ZK] (last visited May 25, 2019).
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possessors to affirmatively disclose the presence ofweapons to police officers
when asked. As a matter of federal constitutional law, officers can only
require citizens to cooperate with inquiries if reasonable suspicion already
existed to justify the stop. In contrast, by requiring citizens to voluntarily
disclose information to officers, "duty to inform" laws arguablyplace these
encounters with law enforcement outside the traditionalTerry v. Ohio stop
context, thus rendering the encounter consensual and failing to solve the
reasonablesuspicion issue.
Second, the Article considers the competing case law in Arizona regarding
the "armedand dangerous"prong of stop andfriskfor lawful gun carriers.
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Serna held that lawful weapons
carriers cannot automatically be considered dangerous for purposes of a
protectivefrisk. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Orman, held otherwise,
andfocusedon characteristicsof gun ownership not explicitly consideredby
the Arizona Supreme Court. But both cases involved consensualencounters
and not involuntary investigative stops. The Article surveys case law from
otherjurisdictionsto offer a balancedapproachto frisks of lawfully stopped,
lawfully armedArizonans.
Third, the Article highlights policy considerationsrelevant to resolving
these competingperspectives, as well as the competing interestsofArizonans
in exercising their statutory possession rights and of officers in protecting
themselves and others when faced with a public weapon carrier.In doing so,
the Article explores for the first time in scholarly literature what, if any,
parallelscan be drawnfrom the experience of officers stopping andfrisking
lawful gun carriersand officers stopping andfrisking lawful knife carriers.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 8, 2015, the Arizona newspaper Arizona Republic ran a story
with the following headline: Celebrationor Concern? We're No. 1for Guns.2
The story reported that, "[flor the third straight year, Arizona was ranked
[the] best state in the nation for gun owners by Guns & Ammo magazine,
which praised the state's self-defense and carry laws, its shooting sports and
strong gun culture." 3 The balance of the article considered the well-worn
debate between gun rights advocates and gun control advocates reflected in
the story's title: was this ranking to be hailed as a victory for the Second
Amendment and responsible gun ownership, or denounced as the reason why
"Arizona is the best state for criminals to get access to guns"? 4
Two things remain unchanged in 2019. First, this aspect of the gun debate
remains as intractable as ever.5 Second, Arizona remains among the most
friendly states in the nation for firearms.' In 2018, Guns & Ammo ranked
Arizona the best state in the nation for firearms for the fifth straight year,
owing largely to its uniquely permissive concealed carry gun laws.' The state
allows Arizonans to carry concealed firearms in public, without a permit, in
more places and with higher capacity magazines than anywhere else in the

2.
Nihal Krishan, Celebration or Concern? We're No. 1 for Guns, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug.
8, 2015, at F 1. The story appeared online a day earlier. Nihal Krishan, Celebrationor Concern?
Arizona
Is
No.
1
for
Guns,
AZCENTRAL.COM
(Aug.
7,
2015),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2015/08/07/arizona-best-state-gunowners/31312751/ [https://perma.cc/229B-D2XE].
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
See Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, Another Shooting, Another Gun Debate. Will the
Outcome
Be
the
Same?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
22,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/politics/school-shooting-gun-debate.html
[https://perma.cc/R4R7-BLHE] (summarizing the state of the gun control debate after the
Parkland, Florida high school shooting, including the response to the National Rifle Association
lobbying efforts by "[t]he gun control side . . a well-financed infrastructure that did not exist"
before the twenty-first century); Elana Schor, The Gun Debate in Congress: From ConcealedCarry to the Assault Weapons Ban, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2018, 5:42 PM),
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/gun-control-debate-concealed-carry-to-assaultweapons-ban/ [https://perma.cc/PQZ6-UDCR] ("The fight over gun control is moving quickly.").
6.
See Keith Wood, Best Statesfor Gun Owners (2018), GUNS & AMMo (Oct. 31, 2018),
http://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/best-states-for-gun-owners-2018/327233
[https://perma.cc/AN2B-SXYD] (ranking Arizona first in the nation for guns in an environment
where, "for the past six years ... most states moved steadily in a pro-gun direction").
7.
Id. ("An effort to weaken Arizona's firearm law preemption statute was defeated this
session, keeping the state at the number one position in our survey for the fifth straight year.").
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nation.8 And a greater percentage of Arizonans carry concealed weapons on
their person in public than virtually any other state. 9
This Article does not wade into the overarching debate about whether
these facts give cause for celebration or concern. Instead, it explores a littlediscussed byproduct of Arizona's concealed carry laws: the increasing
difficulties faced by Arizona law enforcement in protecting such a heavily
armed populace. In particular, the Article considers what constitutes
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity to initiate an investigatory stop
and protective frisk under Terry v. Ohio"o in a state where virtually anyone
can lawfully carry a firearm anywhere in public." While in a "constitutional
carry"' 2 state like Arizona, officers can no longer rely on weapons possession
8.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2019) (lifting concealed carry weapons ban and
eliminating concealed carry permitting requirement); S. 1108, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2010); S. 1113, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009) (entitling people in Arizona to carry
concealed firearms inbars or restaurants); S. 1168, 49thLeg., 2dReg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (banning
property owners from prohibiting the storage of firearms in locked vehicles parked on their lot);
Arizona, GIFFORDs L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/state-law/arizona/ [https://perma.cc/QJ85-LB59] (last visited May 25, 2019) (summarizing
Arizona gun laws: "Arizona does not . . [p]rohibit the transfer or possession of . . large capacity
ammunition magazines"); Arizona's Magazine Capacity Restriction, GUNLAws1O1.coM,
https://www.gunlaws101.com/state/law/arizona/magazine-capacity-restriction
[https://perma.cc/KUW7-HKUX] (last visited Mar. 17, 2019) ("There are no magazine capacity
restrictions in Arizona.").
9.
Concealed carry statistics are notoriously difficult to compile, especially in a
"constitutional carry" state like Arizona that does not require a state-issued permit to carry.
However, one gun rights database tabulating CCW permits by state lists Arizona as having the
fifteenth highest number of CCWs in the country, at 325,421. See Concealed Carry Statistics,
supra note 1. Of the fourteen states with greater absolute numbers of CCWs, only six of them
(Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Utah, and Tennessee) have smaller populations
than Arizona. See US States-Ranked by Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/ [https://perma.cc/P7KQ-J56P] (last visited May 25,
2019). But unlike Arizona, none of these six states have fully unrestricted "constitutional carry"
laws allowing allow for full permit-less concealed carry. Craig Martin, Constitutional Carry
State-by
State,
CONCEALEDCARRY.COM
(Apr.
28,
2017),
https://www.concealedcarry.com/reciprocity/constitutional-carry-state-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/6EQP-HNSE]. Thus, one can safely maintain that Arizona has at least among
the highest percentage of concealed carry citizens in the country.
10. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2019) (removing concealed carry permitting
requirements in Arizona). Arizonans still remain subject to federal firearms laws, which prohibit
possession of firearms by, among others, felons, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018), undocumented
immigrants, domestic violence misdemeanants, unlawful users of or addicts to a controlled
substance, dishonorably discharged veterans, and persons who have renounced their United States
citizenship. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (2018).
12. James Bishop, Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to CarryAfter Heller, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 907, 911 (2012) ("Arizona . . allow[s] any legal resident to carry a concealed handgun
without a permit; these are sometimes called 'constitutional carry' jurisdictions.").
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alone as indicative of criminal activity sufficient to justify a stop, they still
have a duty to protect innocent citizens from armed criminals. The fact that
Arizona's "gun laws . . make it easy for criminals to get their hands on
guns" only complicates this duty.13
Under Terry and its progeny, a police officer may "seize a person and
subject him to a limited search for weapons" if the officer has reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." This "stop and frisk" standard
contemplates a two-pronged analysis: an officer may (1) seize an individual
for a brief investigatory stop upon "reasonable suspicion that the suspect was
involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity," and (2) frisk the
outer clothing of the individual for weapons if she has "reason to believe that
[s]he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." 5
This "reasonable suspicion" standard is "considerably less than
proof . . by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is
necessary for probable cause."" Arizona courts have reaffirmed repeatedly
not only the low threshold for reasonable suspicion," but also the great
deference afforded to officers in making this determination.
But Arizona's public carry laws, enacted in 2010, present a direct
challenge to the once widely held "assumption that a person carrying a
concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons
possession," thus justifying a stop under the first Terry prong.' 9 Moreover,
the once "nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be
dangerous," giving officers the right to frisk armed individuals under Terry's
second prong, seems outdated in a state where the government's clear intent
is to allow its citizens to lawfully and peacefully carry concealed weapons.2 0

13. Krishan, supra note 2; see also About the State Scorecard, BRADY CAMPAIGN,
http://www.cimadvisor.com/?page=scorecard [https://perma.cc/4GSZ-CVCH] (last visited Mar.
17, 2019) (ranking Arizona as the state "with the loosest gun laws in the nation making [it] the
best location[] for criminals and other dangerous people to easily get guns").
14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
15. Id. at 27; accord United States v. Bivens, 204 Fed. App'x. 835, 836 (11th Cir. 2006).
16. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2014); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 277 (2002) ("Reasonable suspicion . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent
conduct."); see also State v. Rogers, 924 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Ariz. 1996).
17. See, e.g., Rogers, 924 P.2d at 1030.
18. See, e.g., State v. Adair, 383 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2016).
19. Matthew J. Wilkins, Note, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of
Firearmsin Terry Analyses, 95 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 1169 (2017); see also Jeffrey Bellin, The Right
to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REv. 1, 25 (2015) ("Traditionally, courts (and police) assumed
that officers could stop and question someone they observed with a concealed handgun, at least
in jurisdictions with strict regulation of concealed weapon carrying.").
20. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1170.
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Within that context, this Article explores three distinct aspects of Arizona
law and policy complicating this growing tension between increasingly
permissive "right to carry" laws in Arizona and the obligation of officers to
safely conduct investigative stops and searches.
First, Section I of the Article examines not only Arizona's permissive
concealed carry firearms laws but also its uniquely permissive knife laws. In
2010, Arizona became the first state in the country to broadly legalize the
open and concealed public carry of any knife or "blade" regardless of size,
function, or lethality.2 ' It concurrently became the first state in the nation to
prohibit local municipalities from restricting or otherwise regulating the sale,
possession, or transfer of blades.22 These all-encompassing permissive
concealed weapons possession laws have directly contributed to the public
"arming of Arizona."
Second, Section II of the Article considers the fact that weapons
possession alone in Arizona can no longer give rise to reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity under the Fourth Amendment, and Arizona's attempt to
nonetheless authorize law enforcement to investigate armed citizens. In
particular, it questions the constitutionality and efficacy of Arizona's socalled "duty to inform" law, which requires concealed carry permit holders
to affirmatively disclose their status to police officers when approached and
provide their permit and identification at an officer's request.23 As a matter
of federal constitutional law, officers can only require citizens to cooperate
with inquiries if reasonable suspicion already existed to justify the stop.2 4 In
contrast, by requiring citizens to voluntarily disclose information to officers,
"duty to inform" laws arguably place these encounters with law enforcement
outside the Terry stop context, thus failing to solve the reasonable suspicion
issue.25
Third, the Article considers the impact of competing decisions in Arizona
and the Ninth Circuit concerning whether an armed individual in public is per
se dangerous and thus subject to a frisk under Terry's second prong. In State
v. Serna, the Arizona Supreme Court held that, "[i]n a state such as Arizona
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3120 (2019); Arizona Knife Laws, AM. KNIFE & TooL
https://www.akti.org/state-knife-laws/arizona/ [https://perma.cc/3756-L3YC] (last visited
Mar. 17, 2019).
22. About
Statewide
Knife
Preemption,
AM.
KNIFE
&
TooL
INST.,
https://www.akti.org/legislation/about-knife-preemption/
[https://perma.cc/AAH4-6EB7] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2019) (listing ten states with knife preemption laws and date law was enacted,
with Arizona enacting its law first in 2010).
23. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (2019).
24. See infra Section H.A.
25. See infra Section I.C.
21.

INST.,
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that freely permits citizens to carry weapons, both visible and concealed, the
mere presence of a gun cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the gun carrier is presently dangerous." 26 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in
UnitedStates v. Orman upheld the search of an Arizona man based solely on
his possession of a concealed weapon.2 7 Adding to the confusion for Arizona
law enforcement, both Serna and Orman involved consensual encounters
with law enforcement,28 leaving open the question of whether and under what
circumstances officers can frisk and disarm involuntarily stopped, armed
Arizonans. Other jurisdictions considering the issue have failed to provide a
principled or consistent solution,29 and the United States Supreme Court
declined the opportunity to resolve a growing circuit split in late 2017.30
The Article concludes by articulating policy considerations pointing to a
modified categorical approach to frisking armed Arizonans, wherein known
firearms possessors are subject to an automatic protective frisk for officer
safety, while possessors of knives or other weapons may be searched only
where circumstances so require it.3 1 The Article draws upon the parallels of
the firearms experience and borrows from tort law to advocate for a balanced
risk-assessment approach to the seizure of knives during an investigatory stop
in Arizona. This inherently flexible approach both reflects the spirit of the
"reasonableness" approach embodied in Terry and the text of the Fourth
Amendment, and offers a balance between the significant rights of armed
Arizonans and the solemn obligations of the state's police officers.

26. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014).
27. See United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007).
28. Serna, 331 P.3d at 411 ("Our holding governs only those circumstances in which the
police wish to search a person with whom they are engaged in a consensual encounter."); Orman,
486 F.3d at 1177 ("We hold that Officer Ferragamo's initial encounter with Orman was
consensual .....").
29. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 705 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J.,
concurring) (concluding that "lawfully-stopped individuals armed with firearms are categorically
dangerous" and thus lawfully subject to search); Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 785
F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) ("Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession 'is
not the default status.' There is no 'automatic firearm exception' to the Terry rule."); United States
v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2000) (comparing an officer's stop of an armed individual
in a concealed carry state based on a suspicion that possession might have been illegal as to a stop
of an individual because he "possessed a wallet, a perfectly legal act").
30. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 705 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
379 (2017).

31.

See Robinson, 846 F.3d at 703-04 (Wynn, J., concurring).
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THE ARMING OF ARIZONA

On April 16, 2010, Arizona transformed from one of the most restrictive
public weapons carry states in the country to arguably the most permissive.
When then-Governor Jan Brewer signed Senate Bill 1108 into law, repealing
a century-old concealed carry weapons ban,32 Arizona became only the third
state (after Alaska and Vermont) to allow the public concealed carry of a
firearm without a permit.33 That same day, and to much less fanfare, Governor
Brewer signed a first-in-the-nation "knife preemption" law, the effect of
which was to strip local municipalities of the ability to regulate knives and
other blades and to broadly legalize without restriction the public carry of any
"cutting instrument." 34
Not surprisingly, these permissive weapons laws have significantly aided
the arming of Arizona. While firearms statistics are notoriously difficult to
validate,3 5 particularly in states like Arizona that do not require firearms
registration or the application for a concealed carry permit, numerous studies
rank Arizona as one of the most heavily armed states in the country.36 A CBS
News study found that nearly one in three Arizonans own a firearm, 37 and a
Pew Research Center study on gun ownership noted that approximately twothirds of all gun owners own more than one gun.38 Moreover, despite
rescinding the need to maintain a concealed carry weapons (CCW) permit,

32. S. 1108, 49thLeg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
33. Do You Still Need a CCW Permit in Arizona?, FIREARMS MASTERY INST. (May 11,
2010),
http://www.firearmsmasteiy.com/2010/05/do-you-still-need-an-arizona-ccw-permit/
[https://perma.cc/Y4JT-EHW3] ("With the passage of SB 1108, the Constitutional Carry Bill,
Arizona became the third state to allow its citizens to legally carry a concealed weapon without a
state issued permit.").
34. S. 1153, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see About Statewide Knife Preemption,
supra note 22.
35. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing difficulty of
finding reliable firearms statistics).
36. Arizona, Gun Ownership by State, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/gunownership-rates-by-state/27/ [https://perma.cc/69ZZ-WJBJ] (last visited May 25, 2019).
37. Id. ("The gun ownership rate in Arizona is 32.3 percent.").
38. Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik, J. Baxter Oliphant & Anna
Brown, America 's Complex Relationshipwith Guns, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 22 (Jun 22, 2017),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/Guns-Report-FORWEBSITE-PDF-6-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EPL-ZGB4] (finding that sixty-six percent of gun
owners own more than one gun, with thirty-seven percent owning two to four guns and twentynine percent owning five or more guns).
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Arizona has issued 325,421 active CCW permits-one for every twenty-two
Arizonans.3 9
These sweeping changes in the law, coupled with the increase in public
carry of weapons, has created legal and logistical challenges for law
enforcement in Arizona. Police officers are charged, first and foremost, with
maintaining the safety and security of citizens in public, and a significant
aspect of maintaining that safety is identifying individuals carrying weapons
who have the power the injure themselves or others. But officers may not
simply stop and disarm anyone carrying a gun or knife under the guise of
protecting the public." Under the post-Terry Fourth Amendment, officers
may only stop, detain, and search someone if they have reasonable suspicion
that the person is engaged in criminal conduct." In Arizona, where public
carry of virtually any weapon by virtually anyone is legal and affirmatively
protected by statute, possession of a weapon alone does not sufficiently
suggest criminal behavior to justify a stop. This reality leaves Arizona police
officers in the unenviable position of divining which armed Arizonans are
criminal threats to public safety and which are merely exercising their rights
to public carry.
This section outlines the history of Arizona's evolution from a heavily
regulated public carry state to a "constitutional carry" state, including the
major legal challenges defining the contours of Arizona's weapons laws
along the way. The section first briefly sketches the national trend towards
permissive concealed carry laws and then places Arizona's concealed carry
history within that broader context. It then discusses Arizona's uniquely
permissive knife laws and the impact these laws have had on national
lobbying efforts to deregulate blades. In doing so, this section implicitly
diagnoses the "problem" facing police as they attempt to maintain safety and
order on Arizona's streets and roadways.

39. Concealed Carry Statistics, supra note 1; Quick Facts: Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/az/PST0452 17
[https://perma.cc/RV2D-CSYS]
(last visited Mar. 14, 2019) (estimating Arizona population of 7,016,270 as of July 1, 2017).
40. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]f the frisk is
justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first
have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. . . . [T]he person
addressed . . certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection."); United States
v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding protective frisk violated the Fourth
Amendment because officers had no reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity); United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528-29 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
officer may not conduct a protective search to allay a reasonable fear that a suspect is armed
without first having a reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop).
41. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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The National Evolution of Concealed CarryLegislation

American opinions about firearms have evolved significantly since the
time Terry was decided in 1968.42 Fifty years ago, the politics of firearm
ownership and possession revolved around bipartisan agreement that public
firearm possession should be strictly regulated.43 Much of this support
stemmed from the assassinations of President John Kennedy, his brother
Robert Kennedy, and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr." While earlier attempts at
national gun control legislation failed, by 1968, Congress passed two
landmark bills with broad bipartisan support: the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968. These laws
combined to significantly restrict interstate firearms transfer, strictly limit
public firearms possession, require federal licensing for firearms dealers,
prohibit most direct mail-order firearms sales, and expand the categories of
persons prohibited from possessing firearms of any kind. 5
Of course, public attitudes about gun rights have changed dramatically
since 1968. Reflecting this shift, states began relaxing restrictions on public
firearm possession in significant numbers by the early 1980s.1 6 Over the
ensuing thirty years, states across the country loosened or eliminated entirely
restrictions on public open and concealed carry of firearms. Advocates for
42. See,
e.g.,
Guns,
GALLUP,
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx
[https://perma.cc/39YX-FSTT] (last visited Mar. 14, 2019) (providing historical public opinion
data about gun regulation). In one historical trend noted by Gallup, sixty percent of Americans
supported the outright ban of handguns in 1959, but by October 2017 support had fallen to twentyeight percent. Id.
43. On August 8, 1967, the House of Representatives passed by a 378-23 margin the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which among other things strictly limited
interstate transfers for handguns and raised the minimum age to twenty-one for buying handguns.
The Senate passed the bill on May 23, 1968, by a 72-4 margin. President Johnson signed it into
law on June 19, 1968, nine days after Terry. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (2018) (codified
as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10726 (2018)).
44. See Jon Michaud, The Birth of the Modern Gun Debate, THE NEW YORKER (Apr.
19, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/the-birth-of-the-modem-gundebate [https://pena.cc/75CN-UEJW] (chronicling the history of the gun control debate in
the years after the John Kennedy assassination); Steven Rosenfeld, The NRA Once Supported
Gun
Control,
SALON
(Jan.
14,
2013),
https://www.salon.com/2013/01/14/thenraoncesupportedgun control/
[https://pena.cc/5Z83-RDM8] (citing "[t]he assassinations of civil rights leader Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Sen. Robert F. Kennedy [as] the tipping point" for federal gun
control legislation, along with "several summers of race-related riots in American cities").
45. See supra note 43; Pub. L. No. 90-135, 82 Stat. 226 (1967) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 921 (2018)).
46. See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, "ShallIssue": The New Wave of Concealed
Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REv. 679, 680-86 (1995) (discussing history of concealed
carry handgun legislation).
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these more permissive firearms possession and carry laws found support from
the United States Supreme Court. In 1997, the Court held that federal
background check requirement under the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act was unconstitutional. Then in 2008, the Court held for the
first time that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to
possess a firearm for self-defense or any other lawful purpose," and extended
that protection in 2010 to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.4 9 These significant changes in public opinion, legislation, and
constitutional law challenge the once-reasonable assumption that a public
gun carrier is a dangerous lawbreaker.
Today, state public gun possession laws fall within one of four "right-tocarry" categories:
Unrestricted: State law allows individuals to carry concealed firearms for
lawful purposes without a permit.5 o These states are sometimes referred to by
gun rights advocates as "constitutional carry" states.

47. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997).
48. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589 (2008); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, WellRegulated Militias, and CriminalStreet Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 6 (2009) (observing that Heller
delivered a significant victory for gun rights advocates and "[i]mperiled [the] [c]ase for [g]un
[c]ontrol").
49. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763-68, 776-78 (2010) (discussing
the well-known doctrine of "selective incorporation," wherein only those most fundamental of
constitutional rights apply to restrict the actions of both the federal and state governments, and
recognizing the "fundamental" nature of individual right to keep and bear arms as one restricting
the states).
50. See Brian Enright, Note, The Constitutional "Terra Incognita" of Discretionary
Concealed Carry Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 909, 918-25 (2015) (discussing types of concealed
carry jurisdictions); see Kansas: Permitless Carry Bill to Receive Vote Tomorrow on Senate
Floor, NAT'L RIFLE
Ass'N:
INST.
FOR
LEGIS.
ACTION
(Feb.
25, 2015),
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20 150225/kansas-permitless-carry-bill-to-receive-votetomorrow-on-senate-floor [https://perma.cc/BL7V-TEYV] (discussing pending "constitutional
carry" or "permitless carry" legislation in Kansas).
51. CBS 13, Maine Lawmaker Submits 'ConstitutionalCarry' Bill, BANGOR DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2015), https://bangordailynews.com/2015/02/26/news/state/maine-lawmaker-submitsconstitutional-carry-bill/ [https://perma.cc/DY2L-RTBU]; see also Charles C.W. Cooke,
Vermont: Safe and Happy and Armed to the Teeth, NAT'L REV. ONLINE: CORNER (Jun. 24, 2014,
8:21 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/396857
[https://perma.cc/7CNT-9Q69]
(noting that "constitutional carry" is sometimes referred to as "Vermont carry" because Vermont
for decades was the only state in the country that did not require a permit to carry a concealed
firearm in public).
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Shall Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in
public, but the granting of such licenses is nondiscretionary and subject only
to meeting determinate criteria set forth in the law.52
May Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in
public and provides the issuing entity with discretion over the issuance of a
permit. 53 This discretion varies significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
No Issue: State law does not allow any private citizen to carry a concealed
handgun in public, with very few limited exceptions.
As recently as 1988, forty states either prohibited the public possession of
firearms (sixteen "no issue" jurisdictions) or tightly regulated such
possession (twenty-four "may issue" jurisdictions).56 But by 1994, the year
Arizona became a "shall issue" jurisdiction, over half of all states had either
no or very few restrictions on concealed carry permitting.
As of 2015, every state and the District of Columbia allow the public
concealed carry of firearms. 5 ' The vast majority of these states are now

52. See Enright, supra note 50, at 919-20 ("As the name suggests, shall-issue laws require
the issuing authority to issue a permit to an applicant who meets delineated requirements. There
is little to no discretion on the part of the issuing body."); see also Walter Rickshaw, What Is the
Difference

Between

Shall

Issue

and

May

Issue?,

CONCEALED

CARRY

CLASS,

-

http://www.concealedcarryclass.net/what-is-the-difference-between-shall-issue-and-may-issue/
[https://perma.cc/37LF-RGWM] (last visited Mar. 16, 2019); Nancy Thorne, What Is the
Difference Between "May Issue", "Shall Issue", "No Issue" and "Unrestricted" Concealed
Carry
Laws?,
NAT'L
CARRY
ACAD.
(Aug.
29,
2016),
https://www.nationalcarryacademy.com/mayissueshallissuenoissue/
[https://perma.cc/L7M3
2P99].
53. See Enright, supra note 50, at 921-23.
54. See id. at 921-22, 921 n.118 (observing that some "may-issue laws . . are applied more
like shall-issue laws" (like Alabama), but "[o]ne of the strictest may-issue laws is found in New
York").
55. See id. at 923-25 ("A no-issue state is one that requires, but does not issue, permits for
public carry."); see also Rickshaw, supra note 52; Thorne, supra note 52.
56. In 1988, nine states were "shall issue" jurisdictions. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-75 (1988)
(a may-issue law interpreted as a shall-issue law); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(a) (1988); FLA.
STAT. § 790.06(2) (1988); IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3 (1988); ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 2003(1) (1988);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.41.070 (1988). Vermont was the lone "unrestricted" jurisdiction. Cooke, supra note 51.
57. Joseph A. Wegenka, Concealed Handgun Laws in the United States 26 (undated)
(unpublished graduate applied project, Western Kentucky University) (available at
[https://perma.cc/5267-XVKV]).
https://www.wku.edu/mae/documents/econ596-wegenka.pdf
Five states became shall issue jurisdictions in 1995: Nevada, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Virginia, and
Utah. Id. at 26 tbl.1. Texas became a shall issue jurisdiction in 1996. Id.
58. Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L.
CTR.
TO
PREVENT
GUN
VIOLENCE,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/
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unrestricted or shall-issue jurisdictions, in which there are little to no
restrictions on an individual's ability to lawfully carry a firearm in public. 59

"

B. Arizona: From Gun Control to "ConstitutionalCarry

Arizona's journey to becoming among the most permissive gun
possession states actually began with Arizona providing some of the stiffest
restrictions on public possession. As early as 1901, "carrying concealed
weapons was prohibited" in the Arizona Territory."o "In fact, the 1913
Arizona Penal Code [after statehood in 1912] mirrored the 1901 Penal Code
of the Arizona Territory, providing 'it shall be unlawful for any person . . to
have or carry concealed on . .. his person, any pistol or other firearm . . . .""'
At the time, few states (and even fewer western territories) had statutory bans
on concealed carry. This strict ban on public concealed weapons possession
was codified at A.R.S. section 13-3102, and remained in force until the ban
was lifted in 2010.62

[https://perma.cc/VQ3U-VNBG] (last visited May 25, 2019) ("Every state-as well as the
District of Columbia-allows the carrying of concealed weapons in some form.").
59. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700 (2019); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (2019); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(2)
(2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (2019); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302(1) (2019); IND. CODE § 3547-2-3 (2019); IOWA CODE § 724.7(1) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c03 (2019); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 237.110(4) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(A)(1) (2019); ME. STAT. tit.
25, § 2003(1) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425b(7) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(2)(b)
(2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(6)(c) (2019); Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.101(1) (2019); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-321(1) (2019); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 69-2430(3)(b), -2433 (2019); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 202.3657(3) (2019); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159:6(I)(a) (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2919-4(A) (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.12 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1)
(2019); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1290.12(A)(12) (2019); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.291 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6109(e)(1)
(2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215(A) to (C) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7
(2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351 (2019); TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.172 (West
2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.02 (2019); WASH.
REv. CODE § 9.41.070 (2019); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 175.60 (2019); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b) (2019). In addition to these forty state statutes, Alabama and
Connecticut "by statute allow considerable police discretion but, in practice, commonly issue
permits to applicants who meet the same standards as in shall-issue states." Drake v. Filko, 724
F.3d 426, 441 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75
(2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(a) (2019).
60. State v. Moerman, 895 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) ("Immediately before and
after the adoption of Arizona's Constitution, carrying concealed weapons was prohibited.").
61. Id; see ARIz. PENAL CODE § 426 (1913); REv. STAT. ARIz. TERRITORY, ARIz. PENAL
CODE § 382 (1901).
62. Moerman, 895 P.2d at 1022; see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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The delegates at the 1910 Arizona Constitutional Convention did adopt
(and the people did ratify) a provision to the Arizona Constitution stating that,
"[t]he right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the
State shall not be impaired," but this right was anything but absolute.63 Two
alternative proposals expressly giving the legislature the right to regulate or
prohibit concealed carry were narrowly rejected, arguably suggesting that the
delegates intended to allow CCW. 4
Arizona gun rights advocates made this exact argument in State v.
Moerman, a 1994 Arizona Court of Appeals case in which two defendants
challenged their convictions for illegally possessing concealed handguns in
public by claiming A.R.S. section 13-3102 violated the Arizona
Constitution. 5 But the Court rejected the claim that "these 'rejected
amendments' support Defendants' argument that the framers of the Arizona
Constitution intended . . . to confer an absolute right to bear arms."66 The
Court observed that the adopted language itself provides a qualified right "in
which 'the right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense ofhimself or
the State shall not be impaired.'"' The Court also noted that, given the
existence of a concealed carry ban prior to the adoption of the Arizona
Constitution, "the framers could have rejected th[ese] amendment[s] to avoid

63. Moerman, 895 P.2d at 1022 ("First, we note that Article II, section 26 itself provides
not an absolute right, but instead a qualified one in which 'the right of the individual citizen to
bear arms in defense ofhimself or the State shall not be impaired .... ). The delegates narrowly
rejected two alternative wordings that explicitly granted the legislature the right to continue
regulating or prohibiting concealed carry. Richard D. Coffinger, Arizona's 100-Year Conflict over
Concealed Weapons, ARiz. ATT'Y, Feb. 2012, at 40, 41-42. These alternatives were:
Proposition No. 104, subsection 9: 'The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be denied or abridged; but this section shall not be construed to
deny the right of the law-making power to regulate or prohibit the carrying of
concealed weapons upon the person.' Proposition No. 116, subsection 17:
'That the right of no citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home,
person or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereto legally
summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained is
intended to justify the practice of wearing concealed weapons.'
Id. at 42.

64. See TIE RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1910 678 (John
S. Goff ed., 1991) (explaining that three alternative proposals were considered, including one that
stated, in part, "But the legislature shall have the right to regulate the wearing of weapons to
prevent crime," and another stating "The people shall have the right to bear arms for their safety
and defense, but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law").
65. Moerman, 895 P.2d at 1020.
66. Id. at 1022.
67. Id.
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redundancy, or because they deemed it to be unnecessary."" The Court
concluded with a full-throated defense of Arizona's concealed carry ban,
citing with approval prior case law that A.R.S. section 13-3102 "was drafted
to 'protect[] the public by preventing an individual from having on hand a
deadly weapon of which the public is unaware, and which an individual may
use in a sudden heat of passion."'69
In dissent, Judge Weisberg found a 1970 amendment to Arizona's CCW
ban unconstitutionally vague. This amendment exempted from the ban
weapons that were "carried in a belt holster which holster is . . . partially
visible, or is carried in a scabbard or case designed for carrying weapons."70
Judge Weisberg maintained that a "case designed for carrying weapons"
arguably could include the "fanny-packs" in which the defendants kept their
handguns, and suggested that "the legislature ought to require that the holster,
scabbard, or case be readily identifiable as containing a weapon." 7 ' Thus,
while dissenting from the opinion, Judge Weisberg actually advocated tighter
restrictions than those contained in the existing statute.
Reflecting the changing attitudes about public gun possession in Arizona
and throughout the country, reaction to the Moerman decision was swift and
negative. Rather than taking Judge Weisberg's advice to more clearly restrict
public gun possession, the Arizona Legislature enacted A.R.S. section 133112, creating the first concealed carry weapons permitting process in the
state and exempting anyone from prosecution who obtained a permit. 72 This
permitting process gave local authorities significant discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny a permit, thus making Arizona a "may issue"
jurisdiction, 73 but it nevertheless reflected a sea change in the public arming
of Arizonans.

68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)). "This statute
is narrowly drawn and .. . it regulates only the manner in which individuals may exercise their
right to bear arms. Although A.R.S. section 13-3102 may limit this right, it neither frustrates nor
impairs it." Id.
70. Coffinger, supra note 63, at 44; see Moerman, 895 P.2d at 1025 (Weisberg, J.,
dissenting); see also S. 12, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1970). Original versions of Senate Bill
12 "would have permitted a woman to carry a weapon in her purse for self-defense," but the
provision was removed after patronizing lobbying from police chiefs, "who contended a woman
would be better protected if she carried in her purse a chemical, such as mace or pepper
spray . . .because great skill is not required to use them." Coffinger, supra note 62, at 44.
71. Moerman, 895 P.2d at 1025 (Weisberg, J., dissenting).
72. H.B. 2131, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1994) (enacted); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133112 (2019); Coffinger, supra note 63, at 45.
73. See Enright, supra note 50, at 921-23.
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Two significant events a decade later accelerated the deregulation of
public concealed carry in Arizona. First, in 2008, the United States Supreme
Court ruled for the first time that the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution protected an individual's right to bear arms for self-defense, not
merely the right to bear arms as part of a state militia." Second, in early 2009,
President Obama appointed Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano to serve as
the Secretary of Homeland Security, allowing Arizona Secretary of State Jan
Brewer as first in the line of succession to become governor.15
Brewer, a longtime member of the National Rifle Association and the
Arizona Rifle and Pistol Association, immediately set out to relax Arizona's
gun laws." Six months after taking office, Governor Brewer signed Senate
Bill 1113, allowing Arizonans to carry concealed guns in bars and restaurants
as long as they did not consume alcohol, unless the business specifically
posted a sign in accordance with Arizona law that guns are not permitted on
the premises." She further expanded the right of CCW permit holders with
Senate Bill 1168, which banned property owners from prohibiting the storage
of firearms in locked vehicles parked on their lots."
Most significantly, however, was Governor Brewer's action on April 16,
2010, when she signed Senate Bill 1108 making it legal for anyone over the
age of 21 to carry a concealed deadly weapon without a permit.7 9 Overnight,
Arizona went from a relatively strict "may issue" state to the third
"constitutional carry" state in the nation, after Vermont and Alaska."o When
then-Senator Russell Pearce sponsored the bill in February 2010, he stated
74. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589 (2008). Because the District of
Columbia ordinance struck down in Heller was federal, the decision did not apply to states. In
State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2010), the Washington Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms applies to the state through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court affirmed that view in McDonald v.
City of Chicago. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
75. See Paul Davenport, BrewerRunningfor Full Term asAriz. Governor, AZCENTRAL.COM
(Nov.
5,
2009,
11:15
AM),
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/2009/11/05/20091105arizonagovernor-ON.html [https://perma.cc/5TN8-XLJ3].
76. See Protecting Second Amendment Rights, JAN BREWER GOVERNOR,
https://web.archive.org/web/20100324121837/http://wwwjanbrewer.com/where-istand/protecting-second-amendment-rights [https://perma.cc/9QR8-6W6W] (last visited Mar. 3,
2019) (position statement of Jan Brewer regarding gun rights, describing her as a "[p]roud
member and longtime supporter of National Rifle Association[,]" and "[p]roud member and
longtime supporter of the Arizona Rifle and Pistol Association").
77. S. 1113, 49thLeg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009).
78. S. 1168, 49thLeg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009).
79. S. 1108, 49thLeg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
80. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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simply that the law would reflect what Arizona's and the nation's founders
intended: "If you are a law-abiding citizen, you have a right to carry.""' In
signing the measure, Governor Brewer echoed this sentiment: "As governor
I have pledged a solemn and important oath to protect and defend the
Constitution.... I believe this legislation not only protects the Second
Amendment rights of Arizona citizens, but restores those rights as well."8 2
In 2013, Governor Brewer defended the law against attempts by
municipalities to enact their own concealed carry regulations, signing into
law a firearms preemption statute requiring all firearms regulation to happen
at the state level. 83 In the same law, she expressly prohibited local
governments from maintaining a list of citizens who possess a firearm." Both
actions, while lauded by gun rights advocates, significantly limited the
flexibility of local law enforcement in how they are able to handle firearms
issues unique to their municipalities.
As reflected in the statistics above, the signing of this legislation not only
helped promote an already-active gun culture in Arizona, but led to an
increase in the number of concealed handguns carried in public. This
dramatic change in Arizona law and culture led the influential gun rights
group Guns & Ammo to rank Arizona as the "Best State for Gun Owners" in
a 2014 study examining each state's gun possession laws, gun and
ammunition purchase laws, self-defense laws, and availability and access to
shooting sports. 5 Arizona has retained the top spot for five consecutive years,
with Guns & Ammo stating in its 2018 survey that:

81. Alia Beard Rau, Push Is on to Ease Arizona 's Gun Laws, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2010,
12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles
/2010/02/03/20100203weaponbills0203.html.
82. Evan Wyloge, Brewer Signs Law to Loosen Restrictions on Carrying Concealed
Weapons,

ARIZ.

CAPITOL

TiMEs

(Apr.

16,

2010),

https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2010/04/16/brewer-signs-law-to-loosen-restrictions-oncarrying-concealed-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/7L9D-CV3D].
83. H.R. 2326, 51st Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) ("Except as provided in subsection F
of this section, a political subdivision of this state shall not enact any ordinance, rule or tax relating
to the transportation, possession, carrying, sale, transfer . .. or use of firearms or ammunition . .
.");Arizona: Governor Brewer Signs Two Pro-GunReforms into Law, NAT'L RIFLE Ass'N: INST.
FOR LEGIS. ACTION (May 1, 2013), https://www.nraila.org/articles/2013050 1/arizona-governorbrewer-signs-two-pro-gun-reforms-into-law [https://perma.cc/5XP4-HMU4].
84. Ariz. H.R. 2326 ("A political subdivision of this state shall not require or maintain a
record in any form. . . including a list, log or database, of ... any identifying information of a
person who owns, possesses, purchases, sells or transfers a firearm.").
85. Best States for Gun Owners 2014, GUNS & AMMo (May 22, 2014),
http://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/best-states-for-gun-owners-2014/249668
[https://perma.cc/H6DB-PYQS1.
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An effort to weaken Arizona's firearm law preemption statute was
defeated this session, keeping the state at the number one position
in our survey for the fifth straight year. Arizona receives 10 points
across the board thanks to its permitless (and permitted) carry law,
a strong preemption statute, excellent use-of-force laws, and a lack
of restrictions on individual firearms and accessories. Beyond a
great set of laws, Arizona has one of the most thriving shooting
cultures in the nation, a factor that helps it maintain its spot at the
top of our list. Anti-gun groups rank Arizona as the worst state in
the nation in terms of gun laws; we say it's the best."6

C. Heller and McDonald in Arizona

'

Governor Brewer's pronouncement that she was "protect[ing] the . .
rights of Arizona citizens"" by eliminating concealed permitting
requirements was arguably buttressed by the United States Supreme Court's
decision two years earlier in Districtof Columbia v. Heller." Prior to Heller,
the Court had never expressly opined on the scope of the Second
Amendment's protections for the individual right to "keep and bear arms" as
opposed to the right of "well-regulated militias" to do so.89
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the restrictive view that
the Second Amendment only granted the people the right to form an armed
militia.90 Instead, he determined that the Amendment protected an individual
right to keep and bear arms that included the right to self-defense with a
firearm and the right to have a working firearm in the home. 9

86.

Keith Wood, Best States for Gun Owners (2018), GuNs & AMMo (Oct. 31, 2018),

http://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/best-states-for-gun-owners-2018/327233
[https://perma.cc/X8XX-MSWR].
87. Wyloge, supra note 82.
88. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589 (2008).
89. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) ("In Heller, the Supreme Court
found for the first time that this language secured an individual, and not just a collective, right to
bear arms.").
90. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 ("The phrase to 'keep arms' was not prevalent in the written
documents of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which
favor viewing the right to 'keep Arms' as an individual right unconnected with militia service.").
91. See id. at 599 (finding that "self-defense . . was the central component of the right
itself"). Heller left open the question of whether the Second Amendment's protections are
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, given Washington, D.C.'s
special status as a federal district. Id. at 620 n.23. The Court addressed that issue two years later
in McDonald v. City of Chicago, finding that the Second Amendment did in fact apply to the
states as well as the federal government. 561 U.S. 742, 772 (2010).
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However, while the Court recognized that some important limitations
existed on this right, it declined to define the contours of those limitations.92
Litigation across the country immediately commenced in federal court over
whether Heller protected the right to public open or concealed carry of
firearms. In the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel considered California's
broad prohibition against the open or concealed carriage of a handgun in
public locations.93 Relying on Heller, the panel found that "the Second
Amendment does require that the states permit some form of carry for selfdefense outside the home," even if the Second Amendment does not
"require[] the states to permit concealed carry."94 After two years of
contentious public controversy over the case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
panel's decision after a rehearing en banc, holding that "the Second
Amendment does not protect, in any degree, the carrying of concealed
firearms by members of the general public."9 5
This decision still left open the question of whether a specific type of
public carry-open-was specifically protected by the Second Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit answered that question in Young v. Hawaii, when it held
that "the Second Amendment encompasse[d] a right to carry firearms openly
in public for self-defense" because "'bear' implies" such a right.96 In striking
down Hawaii's complete ban on public handgun possession, the court also
confirmed that "the concealed carry of firearms categorically falls outside
such [Second Amendment] protection," thus leaving that right up to state
constitutions and legislatures.9 7
Perhaps not surprisingly in a state protecting by statute the near absolute
right to carry firearms in public-openly or concealed-Arizona state courts

92. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 (" [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."). See also id. at
627 (limiting the right to arms that are "in common use," leaving it open to states to regulate and
ban certain types of assault weapons and weapons commonly useful only in military service).
93. Perutav. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 824 F.3d 919
(9th Cir. 2016).
94. Id. at 1172.
95. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942; see also Recent Case, Peruta v. County of San Diego-Ninth
CircuitHolds That Concealed Carry Is Not Protectedby the Second Amendment, 130 HARV. L.
REv. 1024, 1028 (2017) (observing the Ninth Circuit confirmed that "concealed carry is not
protected by the Second Amendment").
96. 896 F.3d 1044, 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2018), reh'g granted en banc, 915 F.3d 681 (9th
Cir. 2019) (mem.).
97. Id. at 1068.
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have only cited the Heller decision three times.98 None of these decisions
considered the constitutional questions at issue in Heller nor otherwise the
right to bear arms in public.99 Arizona federal district courts applying Heller
and its progeny have relied on Heller's emphasis that Second Amendment
rights are "not unlimited"' to reject constitutional challenges to Arizona's
"prohibited possessor" statutes'0 ' and their federal counterpart, as well as to
Arizona's "weapons misconduct statute" prohibiting reckless conduct.' 0 2

D. The Unique Case ofArizona's "Blade"Laws
Though less well-known and polarizing than the National Rifle
Association and other gun rights advocacy groups, an active knife enthusiast
community has also successfully lobbied Arizona and other states to enact
increasingly permissive knife possession laws.' 0 3 Led by the American Knife
& Tool Institute (AKTI),o' these groups fund lobbying efforts to loosen
restrictions on public knife possession, to broaden the scope of "blades"
permitted to be carried in public, and to remove knives and related
instruments from lists of "prohibited deadly weapons" in state statutes.' 05 As
of December 3, 2018, AKTI's "Legislation" page listed no fewer than
eighteen pending bills sponsored at AKTI's request to loosen restrictions on
98. See State ex rel. Brnovichv. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 676 (Ariz. 2017) (discussing
separation of powers issue related to state statute preempting local ordinances regarding
destruction of firearms); Gerald M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, No. 2 CA-JV 2015-0130, 2016 Ariz.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 552, at *33 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 4, 2016) (Howard, J., dissenting)
(considering child custody matter); Pinal Cty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Georgini, 334 P.3d 761, 76676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting claim that due process requires appointment of counsel to
indigent party seeking restoration of forfeited firearms possession rights).
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
100. Lewis v. Ryan, No. CV-17-00220-PHX-JAT (BSB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216584, at
*31 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2017).
101. Swartz v. Ryan, No. CV-12-0023-TUC-FRZ (BPV), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68466, at
*39-40 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014).
102. Id.
103. See About the American Knife & Tool Institute, AM. KNIFE & TOOL INST.,
https://www.akti.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/5FXT-WBRS] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019)
(describing the organization's mission "to ensure that Americans will always be able to make,
buy, sell, own, carry and use knives and edged tools" by "promot[ing] ... reasonable, responsible
and consistent knife legislation to elected officials").
104. Id.
105. Follow
Current Knife
Legislation,
AM.
KNIFE
&
TooL
INST.,
https://www.akti.org/follow-current-knife-legislation/
[https://perma.cc/285H-DPUX]
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2019) ("AKTI has been successful in removing, clarifying and correcting poorly
conceived and ambiguous legislation and educating legislators on knife issues on behalf of the
entire knife community.").
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knife possession. 106 Two federal bills-one which would repeal the Federal
Switchblade Act of 1958107 and one dubbed the "Knife Owners' Protection
Act"' 8 -would virtually eliminate restrictions on interstate sale of knives
and would require national reciprocity by "protect[ing] law abiding knife
owners traveling between states from conflicting state knife laws." 0 9
One of the initiatives supported by AKTI and other knife rights groups is
statewide preemption, wherein the state government would act as the sole
authority on knife laws." 0 Taking the position that "knife owners should not
be expected to know and understand knife laws in multiple . .. jurisdictions
where they may travel within their own state," AKTI has successfully lobbied
for knife preemption laws in eleven states, all since 2010."'
The first state to enact statewide knife preemption laws was Arizona." 2 In
fact, Governor Brewer signed the nation's first knife preemption law on the
same day that she signed Arizona's "constitutional carry" law, transforming
the state indisputably into the most permissive public carry jurisdiction in the
country with two strokes of the pen." 3 This knife preemption law, codified at
A.R.S. section 13-3120, accomplishes three primary objectives. First, it
clearly prohibits any local government from "enact[ing] any ordinance, rule
or tax relating to the transportation, possession, carrying, . . . or use of a knife
or knife making components in th[e] state.""' Second, it defines "knife"
incredibly broadly as "a cutting instrument[,] includ[ing] a sharpened or
106. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1242-1244 (2018) (prohibiting the interstate transfer of automatic
switchblades); see also 155 CONG. REc. 13, 17198 (2009) (observing the "commonly known"
title "Federal Switchblade Act").
108. Knife Owners' Protection Act (KOPA), AM. KNIFE & TOOL INST.,
https://www.akti.org/knife-owners-protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/22Z7-E29Q] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2019) (summarizing need to pass a federal law that would protect knife owners "while
traveling with their knives in the U.S.").
109. Follow
2017
Knife
Legislation,
AM.
KNIFE
& TOOL
INST.,
https://www.akti.org/news/follow-2017-knife-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/AAQ8-DSL7] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019).
110. See About Statewide Knife Preemption, supra note 22 ("The majority of states have

firearms preemption laws enacted as the result of the National Rifle Association's campaign to
ensure consistency of laws for gun owners. We suggest to legislators to include knives into these
preemption laws, where appropriate. Legislators are encouraged to contact the American Knife
& Tool Institute for assistance with wording or advice on knife legislation.").
111. Id. ("These states have knife preemption laws enacted: Alaska (since 2013), Arizona
(since 2010), Georgia (since 2012), Kansas (since 2013), Montana (since 2019)New Hampshire
(since 2011), Oklahoma (effective November 1, 2015), Tennessee (since 2013), Texas (effective
September 1, 2015), Utah (since 2011), Wisconsin (effective February, 2016).").
112. Id.
113. S. 1153, 49thLeg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
114. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3120(A) (2019).
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pointed blade."" 5 The effect of this definition is to broadly preempt

regulation of any type of bladed instrument no matter how dangerous,
including swords, balisongs, bowie knives, gravity knives, maces, stilettos,
or "knives of any length.""'
Third, this preemption statute implicitly legalized the possession, sale, and
public concealed carry of any bladed instrument." 7 At the time Arizona
enacted this preemption statute, no state laws existed creating either a per se
prohibition against certain categories of knives or restricting the public open
or concealed carry of such instruments."' No such laws have been enacted in
the eight years since the preemption law was signed." 9 To date, the only state
law regulating the concealment and carrying of "weapons" at all is A.R.S.
section 13-3102, the same law that made Arizona a "constitutional carry"
state.' 20 That law prohibits only the "carrying [of] a deadly weapon except a
pocket knife concealed on his person . . . [i]n the furtherance of a serious

offense ... or ... if the person is under twenty-one years of age."' 2' In other
words, concealed carry of knives is illegal only to the extent that an Arizonan
is committing a crime with the knife.
While nine other states have since enacted knife preemption laws, all of
these states have at least some statewide restriction on the possession and use
of certain types of dangerous blades. Arizona stands alone in its
permissiveness regarding knife possession. Unsurprisingly, knife rights
groups recognize Arizona as a haven for blade possession.12 As one
enthusiast correctly observed,
If you live in Arizona you are in luck[;] Arizona has the best knife
laws of all 50 states.

. .

. Basically, you can own any type of blade

you want and carry it concealed or in the open without worry....
In 2011 the State of Arizona preempted all municipal laws and,
basically, made every type of knife legal.1 23

115. Id. § 13-3120(F)(1).
116. Arizona Knife Laws,
KNIFE
UP,
https://knifeup.com/arizona-knife-laws
[https://perma.cc/Y5PX-ZNAF] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) [hereinafter KNIFE UP]; see Marc
Lacey, Pushing a Right to Bear Arms, the Sharp Kind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010),

https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05knives.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=05F98
D91278502548B91B92B3A48F5A3&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/BAR8-6Z7H].
117. See KNIFE UP, supra note 116.
118. Arizona Knife Laws, supra note 21.

119. Id.
120. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2019) (" [m]isconduct involving weapons; defenses;
classification; definitions").
121. Id. § 13-3102(A).
122. See KNIFE UP, supra note 116.
123. Id.
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The enactment of this tapestry of laws broadly permitting the public
concealed carry of knives and handguns stands as an unqualified victory for
sporting enthusiasts and staunch Second Amendment advocates in Arizona.
But these laws have complicated matters immeasurably for one prominent
group of public weapons possessors: Arizona's police officers. Law
enforcement personnel are charged with protecting the public by, among
other things, identifying and neutralizing potentially dangerous individuals
before they can commit violent acts against other citizens. But in a state that
allows virtually all citizens to carry open or concealed lethal weapons in
public, officers increasingly have difficulty discerning which public weapons
possessors pose a dangerous criminal threat and which simply are exercising
their statutory rights. The next two sections confront this growing problem,
first by analyzing weapons possession through the "stop and frisk" lens, and
then by exploring conflicting case law regarding when an officer should be
allowed to search and disarm a public weapon carrier.

II.

"REASONABLE SUSPICION" AND POLICING A HEAVILY ARMED
ARIZONA

For much of this nation's history, police investigative authority was
curtailed largely by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that officers obtain
a warrant based upon probable cause.' 24 But the Supreme Court's decision in
Terry v. Ohio in 1968 radically shifted the focus of courts away from warrant
requirements and towards whether officers were acting reasonably in their
interactions with individuals. 2 5 Today, the "Terry stop," often known as a
"stop and frisk," is a ubiquitous and pervasive police tactic requiring only a
"reasonable suspicion" that an individual is engaged in criminal activity and
is "armed and presently dangerous." 2 6 This broad expansion of police power
forever altered the nature, scope, and number of law enforcement interactions
with citizens.

124. See 1

JOSHUA DRESSLER

&

ALAN

C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING

CRIMINAL

261-62 (6th ed. 2013) (observing that the Warren Court criminal procedure cases of
the late 1960s changed the focus of the Fourth Amendment from warrants based on probable
cause to a "general Fourth Amendment standard of 'reasonableness"').
125. Id. ("[Terry] provided the impetus, as well as the framework, for a move by the Supreme
Court away from the proposition that 'warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,' to the
competing view that the appropriate test of police conduct 'is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable."' (citations omitted)).
126. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1968).
PROCEDURE
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When the Court decided Terry in 1968, Arizona prohibited the public
concealed possession of firearms.' 27 That prohibition continued, with some
exceptions, until 2010.128 Thus, one can understand why an Arizona officer
reasonably may have suspected criminal activity was afoot when she
observed, discovered, or received a tip about an individual's possession of a
firearm in public. That possession, by itself, was criminal. 2 9 This logic,
combined with the once "nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was
to be dangerous," provided the necessary justification to conduct an
automatic frisk of public gun possessors.130 But in Arizona's rapidly
changing, gun-friendly deregulatory environment, these assumptions require
reconsideration.
This section defines the contours of current stop and frisk jurisprudence,
the problematic application of reasonable suspicion to a heavily armed
Arizona populace, and the questionable efforts of the Arizona legislature to
resolve this problem through its "duty to inform" laws.

A.

The Stop and FriskParadigm

"The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to be free from
'unreasonable searches and seizures.""1 While Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has long focused on the warrant requirement, Terry shifted
the Supreme Court away from the proposition that 'warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable,' to the competing view that the
appropriate test of police conduct 'is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.' 3 2
In Terry, the Court observed that the Fourth Amendment protects only
againstunreasonable searches and seizures, and thus authorizes searches and
seizures based on less than a warrant or probable cause.' 3 3 The Court defined
127. See supra Section I.B.
128. S. 1108, 49thLeg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).

129. See Bellin, supra note 19, at 31 (describing the widely held "assumption that a person
carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession").
130. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1170 (quoting Bellin, supra note 19, at 32) (describing the
"blanket assumption of dangerousness" under which most officers and courts traditionally
operated with respect to gun possessors).
131. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 407 (Ariz. 2014) (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. IV).
132. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 124, at 262 (citations omitted); see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968) (holding that lawful police encounters can exist "which do[] not
depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stop[] short of an arrest
based upon probable cause").
133. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
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reasonableness as an objective test from the officer's perspective: "would the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?"' 34 Moreover, the Court found that an officer could initiate a
search of a lawfully stopped suspect for "the protection of the police officer
and others nearby," so long as it was "confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer." 3 5 Attempting to limit this
expansion of police search power, the Court explained that this pat down of
the outer clothing "by no means authorize[d] a search for contraband,
evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to
arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and probable cause is essential."'3 6
"Thus, Terry created a two-pronged" test.' 37 Each prong is analyzed
separately; the satisfaction of one prong cannot serve as justification for the
second prong. Under the first prong, an officer may stop an individual (the
seizure) if she has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'3 8 Under the
second prong, an officer may frisk the individual (the search) if she has
reasonable suspicion that the person "is armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others."' 39 Because these analyses are distinct, an officer may
reasonably suspect a person is committing a crime but lack the requisite
suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous, and vice versa.'
134. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted) (" [I]njustifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.... If subjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would
be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police.").
135. Id. at 29.
136. Id. at 16 n.12 (quoting State v. Terry, 214 N.E. 2d 114, 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966)).
137. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1168. First, "to initiate an investigatory seizure, a police
officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped 'ha[s] engaged, or [is] about
to engage, in criminal activity."' Id. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 332 (2009)).
Second, to search the individual, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion that "he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." Id. at 1169 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968)).
138. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
139. Id. at 24; see also Bellin, supra note 19, at 30.
140. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-31. "[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer
during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on
an encounter, to make a forcible stop. . . . [The person addressed] certainly need not submit to a
frisk for the questioner's protection." Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Gray, 213
F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding protective frisk violated the Fourth Amendment
because officers had no reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal activity);
United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer may not
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Arizona courts have reaffirmed this distinct, two-pronged analysis under
Terry, as well as the limited scope of a protective frisk:
"Terry allows a frisk only if two conditions are met: officers must
reasonably suspect both that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect is
armed and dangerous.""' "Although a frisk is less intrusive than a full-body
search, the Fourth Amendment prohibits any search of an individual unless
the police have a reasonable belief' that the two Terry prongs have been
met.' 42 A Terry "pat-down search" allows the police to "'pat[] down a
suspect's outer clothing"' in a manner "limited to that which is necessary for
the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the office or others
nearby."'4 3
Notably, Arizona courts have also emphasized the constitutional
requirement that officers develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
prior to conducting a frisk, even if the officer feels endangered by an armed
individual's presence. For example, in State v. Serna, the Arizona Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts and invalidated a frisk of an individual who
was standing in the middle of the street at night.' 44 Although the officer
observed a "bulge," the court emphasized the lack of a predicate to justify the
search: "facts sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.""
Despite Arizona courts' respect for the distinct two-pronged analysis
under Terry, the "reasonable suspicion" standard under either prong remains
low in Arizona.' 4 ' An officer does not need probable cause to stop an
individual.' 47 Indeed, reasonable suspicion may be demonstrated through an
evidentiary showing that is "considerably less than a preponderance of the
evidence." 48 While the stop must "be based on specific [and] articulable

conduct a protective search to allay a reasonable fear that a suspect is armed without first having
a reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop).
141. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014).
142. State v. Primous, 394 P.3d 646, 648 (Ariz. 2017).
143. State v. Valle, 996 P.2d 125, 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 375-76 (1993)).
144. 331 P.3d at 406-07.
145. Id. at 411.
146. Id. (observing that "a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity [is] a low standard,
readily established in many search settings").
147. Id.; State v. Evans, 332 P.3d 61, 63-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) ("Although an officer's
reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need
not rise to the level required for probable cause." (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
274 (2002))).
148. State v. Ramsey, 224 P.3d 977, 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (citing United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
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facts,"' 49 Arizona courts have repeatedly observed that they will consider the
"officer's relevant knowledge, experience, and training,"5 0 and will not
"judge the dangers [facing an officer] '[w]ith the benefit of hindsight and
calm deliberation,' but from the 'perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene. "'
Courts consider "the totality of the circumstances-the whole
picture,"1 52 and allow officers to draw "rational inferences from th[e]
facts,"1 53 including presence in a "high crime area" 5 or a "bulge" in an

individual's pocket. "5
B. Lawful Carry and Unlawful Stops
In the fifty years since Terry was decided in 1968, the United States
Supreme Court has authorized a near-linear expansion of the permissible
scope of the stop and frisk practice. While Terry involved an on-the-street
stop of a would-be robber casing an establishment with a gun bulging from
his coat, 156 since then the Court has upheld an officer's ability to frisk
individuals stopped for minor traffic violations who are suspected of carrying
weapons, " search car compartments within "the lunge area" of the stopped
individual,' 5 arrest suspects for refusing to affirmatively identify themselves
during a Terry stop,1 59 and initiate a stop based on a mistake of law. 60

149. Id.
150. State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868, 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
151. State v. Serna, 307 P.3d 82, 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Ryburnv. Huff, 565 U.S.
469, 477 (2012)), vacated and rev'd, 331 P.3d 405 (Ariz. 2014).
152. State v. Ruiz, 372 P.3d 323, 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
153. State v. Jarzab, 599 P.2d 761, 763 (Ariz. 1979).
154. Ramsey, 224 P.3d at 982.
155. State v. Primous, 394 P.3d 646, 648 (Ariz. 2017).
156. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968).
157. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330-31 (2009) ("Most traffic stops . . resemble, in
duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry . . .. [T]raffic stops are
especially fraught with danger to police officers." (citations and quotations omitted)).
158. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (holding that the principles of Terry
"compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile . . is
permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief . . that the suspect is dangerous
and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons"); United States v. Morris, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 45162, at *4 (5th Cir. 1996) (citingMichigan v. Long to uphold officer's protective
search of "the 'lunge area"' of a suspect's car for weapons).
159. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) ("[A]n officer may
not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably
related to the circumstances justifying the stop.").
160. See Heienv. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (observing that the "reasonable
suspicion" standard allows for officers to make reasonable mistakes of fact regarding criminality
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But in Arizona, the reasonableness calculation underlying current stop and
frisk jurisprudence requires reexamination for armed individuals in public.
To initiate a stop, an officer must have "reasonable suspicion supported by
articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot."" 6 ' But gun possession
alone no longer reasonably indicates unlawful activity in Arizona, despite the
low "reasonableness" standard articulated in Terry.'62 The state's
"increasingly permissive gun-possession laws erode the assumption that
public handgun possession is unlawful."' 63 When Arizona "elect[ed] to
legalize the public carry of firearms, . . . the Fourth Amendment equation
change[d], and public possession of a gun is no longer 'suspicious' in a way
that would authorize a Terry stop."' 4 Therefore, reasonable suspicion to
initiate a Terry stop requires more than the mere presence of a firearm.6 5
Neither can an officer stop an armed individual solely for protection
purposes under Terry's second prong.' 6 6 While Terry authorizes protective
frisks for the safety of the officer and the nearby public, such a frisk requires
as a predicate that the individual is lawfully stopped on suspicion of criminal
or dangerousness, and finding that "[t]here is no reason . . why this same result should [not] be
acceptable . . when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law").
161. In re Ilono H., 113 P.3d 696, 697 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
162. Bellin, supra note 19, at 26, 41 ("[C]ourts will be hard-pressed to accept, as constituting
'reasonable suspicion' of a crime, an observation of an increasingly common [and lawful] activity
163. Id. at 25 ("Consequently, the Fourth Amendment authority flowing from that
assumption must be reevaluated.").
164. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting)
("'Permitting such a justification' for a Terry stop . . . 'would eviscerate Fourth Amendment
protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states."' (quoting United States v. Black, 707
F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013))).
165. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (finding unconstitutional search of
individual based solely on tip that he was carrying a firearm and declining to adopt a "firearm
exception" to Terry stops); see also Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 232 (Ind. 2017) (citing J.L.
and finding inadequate a "tip provided by the taxi driver [that] made no 'assertion of illegality,'
[but] rather . . merely had a 'tendency to identify a determinate person' who was in possession
of a handgun").
166. See, e.g., United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that
reasonable suspicion is "required prior to a frisk when the officer's initial encounter with the
citizen is voluntary"); United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that a
"police officer may elevate a police-citizen encounter into an investigatory detention only if the
officer has a 'reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be
afoot""' (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989))); United States v. Ubiles, 224
F.3d 213, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding stop and search based on possession of gun unjustified
because carrying firearms was not illegal and thus could not alone provide reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity); United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding
protective frisk violated Fourth Amendment because officers had no reasonable suspicion that a
man who willingly stopped and answered questions was engaged in criminal activity).
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activity.' 7 Arizona courts have long held that "an officer's right to conduct a
pat-down search should be predicated on the officer's right to initiate an
investigative stop in the first instance."' 8 Indeed, to hold otherwise would be
to subject all lawfully armed and law abiding Arizonans to random searches
of their person and vehicles for merely exercising their statutory rights to
carry weapons. This approach would untether the Fourth Amendment from
its reasonable suspicion foundations and eviscerate Fourth Amendment
protections for public weapons carriers.

C.

Arizona's "Duty to Inform" Law

In an unrestricted or "constitutional carry" jurisdiction like Arizona, where
no state limits exist on the right to carry firearms in public, officers cannot
demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminality based solely on firearm
possession.' 69 But what if the officer suspects the armed individual is in
possession of the weapon illegally, either as an underage Arizonan or a
convicted felon? Without any other indicia of criminality giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that some non-weapons possession offense was being
committed, the officer likely would have to resort to asking the individual for
proof of his authority to possess the weapon. But without reasonable
suspicion to initiate a stop, what right under the first Terry prong would an
officer have to demand such information? 7 0
Although Arizona police officers may no longer reasonably rely on an
individual's weapons possession to suspect criminal activity and initiate an
investigative detention, it often remains important from a protection
standpoint for officers to know whether someone possesses a weapon. For
167. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]f the frisk is justified
in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have
constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter .... ).
168. In re Ilono H., 113 P.3d 696, 700 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); see also Gomez v. United
States, 597 A.2d 884, 890-91 (D.C. 1991) (notingthat, without reasonable suspicion, police could
not justify a frisk based on officer safety concerns alone); Commonwealthv. Narcisse, 927 N.E.2d
439, 445 (Mass. 2010) ("[P]olice officers may not escalate a consensual encounter into a
protective frisk absent reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit a criminal offense and is armed and dangerous."); Speten v. State, 185 P.3d
25, 33 (Wyo. 2008) ("[T]here is neither a 'freestanding' right to search based solely upon officer
safety concerns, nor is there a 'freestanding' right to search based solely upon reasonable
suspicion of the presence of weapons . . . .").
169. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that to allow stops
of all armed persons in a permissive concealed carry jurisdiction "would effectively eliminate
Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed persons").
170. See Bellin, supra note 19, at 38-39 (discussing constitutional problems with "gunlicense inquiry" statutes).
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example, an officer at a crowded and heated protest rally would certainly
want to know whether one of the more agitated participants was armed.
Moreover, an officer would be keenly interested in knowing whether a
convicted felon or a minor-both prohibited firearms possessors under
Arizona and federal law-were in possession of a firearm. But without
independent reasonable suspicion of criminality to detain and question the
individuals, how can an officer gain this information?
Arizona has attempted to solve this issue by giving law enforcement
greater authority to investigate the presence and lawfulness of public
weapons possession."' A.R.S. section 13-3102 authorizes police officers to
inquire whether an individual "is carrying a concealed deadly weapon,"
whether or not the officer has any suspicion that the individual has committed
or is committing a crime.' 72 In fact, "failing to accurately answer the officer"
is itself a crime.173 A corollary to this provision requires Arizona concealed
carry permit holders to carry their permits with them and present them to
officers upon request.17
In essence, Arizona has created a form of weapons-license inquiry
mechanism whereby, as a condition of exercising concealed carry rights,
possessors agree to disclose the presence of weapons (and permit licenses) to
police officers upon request.' 5 Several other states have enacted similar
"gun-license inquiry" laws, though most of these sister statutes go further
than the Arizona law in that they require public gun possessors to
affirmatively disclose the presence of firearms (and provide the relevant
permit, where necessary) as soon as they are approached by a peace officer."'
In contrast, Arizona only requires such disclosure if specifically asked by an
officer."'
171. See, e.g., id. at 29 (discussing legislation in Georgia authorizing police officers to ask
for documents confirming lawfulness of gun possession).
172. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A)(1)(b) (2019).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 13-3112(A).
175. Bellin, supra note 19, at 38-39.
176. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.07(A) (2019) (requiring permit information to be
entered into a database "so that the permit's existence and current status will be made known to
law-enforcement personnel accessing the Network for investigative purposes."); WIs. STAT.
§ 175.60(12)(b) (2019) (providing for database that can be queried "to confirm that a license . .
is valid" and when "an individual is carrying a concealed weapon and claims to hold a valid
license . . but does not have his or her license document or certification card, to confirm that the
individual holds a valid license or certification card"). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129(k)
(2019) (prohibiting "multijurisdictional data base of information regarding persons issued
weapons carry licenses").
177. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112(A)-(C) (2019) (requiring licensees "to carry the
permit" and "present the permit for inspection to any law enforcement officer on request"); see

536

ARIZONA STATE LAW JO URNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

This approach makes sense as a matter of policy, as it allows officers to
determine whether a safety issue exists in a sensitive location, such as a
crowded mall, and respond accordingly. If an officer identifies an armed
individual in a sensitive location, he can then inquire further about the
individual's motives and ability to lawfully possess the weapon.17
But this sound policy does not solve the constitutional issue surrounding
stops of lawful weapons carriers. Rather, this duty to inform law raises
serious constitutional questions in its own right. Under a traditional Terry
analysis, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
initiate an investigative seizure.' 79 While an officer can ask an armed
individual any question he wants-including whether he has a concealed
carry permit-that individual has every constitutional right not to answer
unless that individual has been constitutionally "seized." That seizure is only
permissible if the officer has individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. In other words, an arrest for failure to present a concealed carry
permit can only be upheld as long as the stop was "justified at its inception"
and the request for information "has an immediate relation to the purpose,
rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop."'
Thus, under existing precedent, these weapons-possession inquiries can
only survive constitutional scrutiny if the officer had some independent,
lawful reason to initiate the Terry stop. If the police cannot constitutionally
require weapons carriers to disclose their carriage of weapons, officers cannot
consider a failure to respond to a voluntary possession inquiry as a basis for
reasonable suspicion.'

also D.C. CODE § 7-2502.08(c) (2019) (same); TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.205 (West 2019)
(same); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.01(A) (2019) (same); WIs. STAT. § 175.60(2g)(b)-(c) (2019)
(same); cf N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 38, § 5-22(6) (2019) ("The licensee shall
be in possession of her/his license at all times while carrying, transporting, possessing at
residence, business, or authorized small arms range/shooting club, the handgun(s) indicated on
said license.").
178. See, e.g., United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007).
179. See id. ("The framework's constitutionality depends on whether police can compel gun
carriers to stop what they are doing and produce a firearm license.").
180. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185, 188 (2004); see also Bellin,
supra note 19, at 40 ("Gun-license-inquiry provisions purport to authorize police to request a
license priorto the officer's development of 'reasonable suspicion' to suspect a gun carrier of any
offense. The proper analogy would be to a police officer pulling over a driver who had not violated
any traffic law and asking the driver to produce a license .... ).
181. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that without "at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed . . stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license . . [is] unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment"); Bellin, supra note 19, at 39-40.
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Thus, Arizona's duty to inform law only has teeth to the extent that
individuals consent to the officer's questioning. But while a police officer is
free to approach individuals and ask questions absent reasonable suspicion,
individuals are free to refuse to cooperate.' 82 But in a "weapon possession
inquiry" state like Arizona, would not refusal to cooperate indicate unlawful
weapons possession as a matter of logic, at least where the officer knows the
individual is armed? Such a scenario seems likely in a gun-license inquiry
regime, but it would also turn Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on its head.
"[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level
of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."183 But in a
jurisdiction where every law-abiding gun carrier has consented to cooperate
with authorities, it would appear that an individual's refusal to cooperate,
without more, would create reasonable suspicion of unlawful weapons
possession."8
These duty-to-inform laws seem particularly ill-suited in "constitutional
carry" states like Arizona, where virtually no restrictions exist on the right to
carry concealed guns and knives. Even if an individual answers "yes" to an
innocent officer's inquiry as part of a consensual encounter, what pertinent
information does that answer reasonably furnish in a state where concealed
possession without a permit is legal? Unlike "may issue" and "shall issue"
states requiring concealed carry permit applicants to contract with the state to
furnish their permits to officer's upon request to confirm the lawfulness of
their possession, Arizonans' lawfulness to possess generates from their
presence in the state.

III.

DOES ARMED EQUAL DANGEROUS IN ARIZONA?

As the previous section illustrates, when the Arizona legislature "decided
its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets," Arizona police
182. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) ("We have consistently held that a
refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification
needed for a detention or seizure.").
183. Id; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes
no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.").
184. Concealed permit carriers are free to contract away certain Fourth Amendment rights.
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (affirming surrender of Fourth Amendment
rights); Jason S. Thaler, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or
Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1777, 1794-95 ("The Supreme Court has
affirmed the view that a person can surrender constitutional rights by contract. Individuals may
voluntarily contract away Fourth Amendment rights."). But their decision to do so should not
strip away the robust Fourth Amendment protections of those who chose not to do so.
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lost the authority initiate Terry stops based on nothing more than suspicion
of weapons possession.11 But once a lawful Terry stop has been initiated,
what level of reasonable suspicion is necessary to initiate a frisk? Must the
officer determine through "specific and articulable facts" that the suspect is
not only armed, but also dangerous?'. Can the officer simply rely on the
actual or suspected presence of a weapon to conclude that the individual is
"armed, and thus dangerous?"'"' And does the analysis change whether the
weapon is a firearm or a knife?
The following section considers the contradictory answers provided to
these questions by the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona Supreme Court, and other
jurisdictions.
A. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Orman'8 8
On August 20, 2004, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Dale Orman and his wife
entered the Paradise Valley Mall in Phoenix. An employee of Arizona Public
Service, a local utility company, observed Orman placing a handgun in his
boot before entering the mall and reported it to mall personnel.' 8 9 Mall
security contacted Officer John Ferragamo of the Phoenix Police Department,
who shortly thereafter found Orman in the mall based on the description
provided.' 9 0 Ferragamo approached Orman and asked whether he was
carrying a handgun, and Orman admitted that he was.' 9 ' Ferragamo
immediately retrieved the handgun and then directed Orman to the mall
security office, where he was later arrested for being a felon in possession of
a firearm.' 9 2
Orman challenged the search as unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, pursuant to Terry's two-pronged approach that reasonable
185. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131-33 (6th Cir. 2015).
186. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 709 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Supreme Court for decades has adhered to the conjunctive 'armed and dangerous'
formulation, giving no indication that 'dangerous' may be read out of the equation as an
expendable redundancy.").
187. Id. at 700 (observing that the Court in Terry concluded that the suspect was "armed and
thus presenteda threat to the officer's safety").
188. Ninth Circuit decisions clearly have binding effect on federal decisions reached in
Arizona. Moreover, while "decisions of the Ninth Circuit . . are not binding," they are often
relied upon as "persuasive authority to which Arizona courts may look." Phx. Newspapers, Inc.
v. Reinstein, 381 P.3d 236, 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
189. See United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007).
190. See id. at 1171-72.
191. See id. at 1172.
192. See id.
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suspicion of criminal activity must be present before a protective search can
be conducted.' 93 In surprisingly broad language, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument, finding that the seizure was justified "for safety purposes" even if
the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.' 94
Even though Officer Ferragamo readily admitted he lacked reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity and was only concerned that Orman "might
have a gun" in a state authorizing permitless concealed carry, the court upheld
the search, explaing that "reasonable suspicion that [a person is] carrying a
gun . . . is all that is required for a protective search under Terry." 9 5
The court justified its decision by emphasizing both the purpose of a Terry
frisk and the unique circumstances of the case at hand. The court observed
that:
Terry explained that a search for weapons is justified by the
"immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with
a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him"...... [I]t would be "clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person
is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm."196

On its face, this reasoning appears to eliminate entirely the first prong of
Terry. Officer Ferragamo did not need reasonable suspicion that Orman was
engaged in criminal activity to stop and frisk him because Ferragamo
reasonably suspected Orman was armed, which "is all that is required." 97
This reasoning would appear to render Terry's longstanding two-pronged test
into a disjunctive inquiry: an officer can stop someone if reasonable suspicion
exists that criminal activity is afoot, or an officer can frisk someone (which
necessarily entails a "stop") if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is
armed.
The court also attempted to justify its troubling result by emphasizing that
Officer Ferragamo's quick retrieval of the weapon was far less "intrusive"
than a traditional frisk pat-down, and that the gun was readily accessible to
Orman as Ferragamo stood "only inches" away.1 98 To the court, this "record

193. See id. at 1172-73.
194. Id. at 1176.
195. Id.; see also id. at 1173 ("Terry did not cabin the use of officer safety patdowns to lawful
investigatory detentions.").
196. Id. at 1176 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1968)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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evidence[d] the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an
investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and
others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so."' But a search
is a search, and the forced disarmament of an armed individual undoubtedly
qualifies. Under Terry and well-settled Fourth Amendment precedent, such
frisks, even if less invasive than other frisks, requires the predicate of
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.20 0
In its truncated analysis, the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss whether Orman
was "presently dangerous" when frisked by Ferragamo.2 0 1Terry states that an
officer can frisk an individual only if reasonable suspicion exists that the
suspect is armed and presently dangerous, suggesting that the possession of
a weapon alone may not justify a protective frisk.202 The court's broad
language that "carrying a gun" is all that is required to justify a search seems
to create a categorical approach, at least as to firearms: if you are in
possession of a firearm, you are necessarily and presently dangerous.203
One final aspect of the case may explain the logic behind the court's
puzzling decision, at least partially. The encounter preceding the frisk was
consensual; thus, Officer Ferragamo did not need reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to initiate the questioning of Orman. 204 But whether an
officer needs suspicion of criminal activity to start questioning someone is
quite different from whether the officer needs suspicion that the individual is
"armed and presently dangerous" to initiate a frisk. The Arizona Supreme
Court directly addressed this issue in 2014.
B. Arizona State Courts: State v. Serna
At approximately 10:00 p.m., two officers patrolling a "gang
neighborhood" in Phoenix observed Johnathon Serna and a woman standing
in the middle of the street.20 5 When the officers turned their patrol car towards
199. Id. at 1177.

200. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. The court's reliance on Pennsylvania
v. Mimms on this point is misplaced. See Orman, 486 F.3d at 1176-77. The court notes that the
Supreme Court upheld the frisk of a suspect driving with an expired plate after the officer noticed
a bulge under his jacket, explaining that "any man of reasonable caution would likely have
conducted the pat down." Id. But unlike here, reasonable suspicion (indeed, likely probable cause)
of criminal conduct existed to justify the frisk, because public gun possession was illegal in
Pennsylvania at the time.
201. Orman, 486 F.3d at 1176-77.
202. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).

203. Orman, 486 F.3d at 1176.
204. See id.

205. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 406 (Ariz. 2014).
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the pair they separated, and the officers pulled their car up next to Serna.20 6
When the Officer Richey called to Serna, he walked over to the patrol car and
was "very cooperative and polite" during the brief conversation.20 7 Officer
Richey then noticed a bulge on Serna's waistband and asked if he was
carrying firearms.20 8 Serna replied that he had a gun, at which point both
officers ordered Serna to put his hands on his head while Officer Richey
removed the gun from Serna's person.209 When Serna later admitted he had a
felony conviction, the officers arrested him as a prohibited possessor of a
firearm.2 10
Serna moved to suppress the firearm as illegally obtained evidence under
the Fourth Amendment.2 1 ' When the case reached the Arizona Supreme Court
in 2014, two critical issues faced the court. First, the Court considered
"[w]hether an officer must possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot in order to frisk an individual."2 12 Second, it explored whether, even
if an officer has no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the mere fact
that an individual was armed was sufficient under Terry's second prong to
initiate a protective frisk.213
As to the first issue, the Court emphatically (and correctly) said yes,
reaffirming the distinct, conjunctive two-pronged approach in Terry.2 14
Relying on Adams v. Williams2 15 and Arizona v. Johnson,2 16 the Court
concluded that two independent threshold criteria must be met to justify a
protective frisk: "First, the investigatory stop must be lawful" by virtue of the
officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; "Second, to proceed from
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

212. Id. In articulating the issue, the Court succinctly summarized the open Terry question
before it:
In Terry, the Court stated that an officer is justified in frisking individuals for
weapons if the officer can reasonably conclude "[1] that criminal activity may
be afoot and [2] that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous." The question before us now is whether a frisk must be
supported by both of these conditions, or whether satisfying just one will
suffice.
Id. at 408.
213. Id. at 409.
214. See id. at 408.
215. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
216. 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
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a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person
stopped is armed and dangerous."217 The Court relied heavily on the
concurrence of Justice Harlan in Terry explaining why independent
reasonable suspicion was required for a protective frisk:
[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an
encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any
person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he
considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to
disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a
right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That right must be
more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address
questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has
an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly
need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I would
make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk . . depends on the
reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.218
As to the second issue, whether an armed individual is per se dangerous
for purposes of a Terry frisk, the Court answered no.219 In doing so, it
"disagree[d] with the Ninth Circuit's determination [in Orman] that mere
knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second
prong of Terry, which itself involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect
be 'armed and presently dangerous."'2 20 The Court found that, "[i]n a state
such as Arizona that freely permits citizens to carry weapons, both visible
and concealed, the mere presence of a gun cannot provide reasonable and
articulate suspicion that the gun carrier is presently dangerous."22 1
This reasoning mirrors that of courts in the Sixth222 and Seventh Circuits,223
as well as the original Fourth Circuit panel decision2 24 and a vigorous en banc

217. Serna, 331 P.3d at 408.
218. Id. at 408-09 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
219. Id. at 410.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding that "[c]learly established law require [s] [officers] to point to evidence" that suspects are
both "armed and dangerous").

223. See United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
224. See United States v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 206 n.2 (4th Cir. 2016) ("The Supreme
Court for decades has adhered to its conjunctive 'armed and dangerous' formulation, giving no
indication that 'dangerous' may be read out of the equation as an expendable redundancy.").
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dissent in United States v. Robinson.22 5 A significant flaw in this reasoning
exists, however, in that it assumes all lawful activity is necessarily not
dangerous. By claiming that Arizona's permission for citizens to carry
weapons negates the dangerousness of those citizens, the Serna Court ignores
the inherent dangerousness of weapons-especially firearms-even when
handled properly by law abiding individuals.22 6 While the Court correctly
observed that the broad permission granted Arizonans to lawfully possess
weapons negates the automatic conclusion that such possession is indicative
of unlawful behavior, it fails to address the fact that lawful possession can
nonetheless be dangerous.
Of course, many lawful activities are dangerous. Driving a car is among
the most dangerous activities widely engaged in by a majority of citizens, but
that does not give officers the right to stop all drivers-only the reckless ones.
Or put differently, a firearm in the hands of a criminal intent on committing
armed robbery certainly poses a greater danger than a firearm in the hands of
a law-abiding citizen holstering the weapon for defensive protection. But that
is precisely the point. An officer faced with the decision whether to frisk an
armed individual under Terry's second prong has already reasonably
determined that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. That
determination alone raises the risk that the armed individual is dangerous.
For its part, the Serna Court did acknowledge this possibility,
hypothesizing that, "[h]ad reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed
before the encounter or developed during the encounter, given that Serna was
armed, the officer may have had grounds to frisk Serna."227 But because the
encounter between Serna and the officer was consensual, no right existed to

225. See United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 711 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting)
("[B]y equating 'armed' with 'dangerous' even in states where the carrying of guns is widely
permitted, the majority's rule has the effect of depriving countless law-abiding citizens of what
otherwise would be their Fourth Amendment and other constitutional rights.").
226. See Robinson, 846 F.3d at 705 ("[I]ndividuals who choose to carry firearms-are
inherently dangerous."); In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (noting the affirmative duties of care imposed on "manufacturers of firearms, an inherently
dangerous instrumentality"); Smith v. Brooks, 545 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(observing that "a higher standard of care" applies because "a loaded firearm .., amounted to an
inherently dangerous instrumentality"). Courts in criminal cases have long referred to firearms as
"inherently dangerous instrumentalit[ies]" for purposes of inferring intent. See, e.g., State v.
Widner, 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio 1982) (finding that a jury can infer intent to kill when a
firearm is used, "[g]iven the fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use
of which is reasonably likely to produce death"); State v. Clark, No. 89371, 2008 WL 803034, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008) ("A jury can infer intent to kill by the defendant's use of a
firearm, an inherently dangerous instrumentality . . . .").
227. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014).
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conduct a frisk absent the development of reasonable suspicion to initiate an
involuntarily stop.22 8
This aspect of Serna reflects the limits of its holding: read narrowly, the
case only applies to consensual encounters and does not answer the more
difficult question of whether officers can automatically frisk and disarm
weapons carriers in Arizona who have been lawfully stopped under Terry.22 9
On that question, the Court offered conflicting signals. On the one hand, the
Court seemed to imply that an officer needed only to develop reasonable
suspicion that the lawfully stopped individual was armed.230 But elsewhere in
its opinion, the Court emphasizes the two-pronged inquiry contained within
Terry's second prong: that an individual must not only be armed but also
dangerous before an officer can frisk him. Whether and to what extent
weapons possession could lead to a per se finding of dangerous-for
example, when an individual possesses a high-capacity AR-15 in a crowd
versus when an individual possesses a switchblade on an empty street-was
left unanswered by the Court.
C. What About NonconsensualEncounters?
Orman and Serna reached radically different conclusions on remarkably
similar facts, only increasing confusion for Arizona officers deciding whether
and when to frisk an armed individual. These cases suffer from another
limitation: they both involved consensual encounters and did not directly
address when an officer can frisk a lawfully and involuntarily stopped armed
Arizonan.2 3 ' Put another way, is a lawfully stopped armed individual
automatically dangerous for purposes of Terry's second prong, or must an
officer make an independent determination that the suspect is not only armed,
but also dangerous?
Courts in other jurisdictions have split on the issue. For example, in United
States v. Robinson,23 2 the Fourth Circuit held that any individual who the
police suspect possesses a firearm becomes a dangerous individual per se for
228. See id. ("To conclude otherwise would potentially subject countless law-abiding persons
to patdowns solely for exercising their right to carry a firearm.").
229. See id. at 411 ("Our holding governs only those circumstances in which the police wish
to search a person with whom they are engaged in a consensual encounter.").
230. See id. at 410.
231. See id. at 411 ("Our holding governs only those circumstances in which the police wish
to search a person with whom they are engaged in a consensual encounter.") (emphasis added);
United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We hold that Officer Ferragamo's
initial encounter with Orman was consensual. . . .") (emphasis added).
232. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017).
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Terry purposes.23 In contrast, in Northrup v. City of Toledo Police
2 34
Department,
the Sixth Circuit held that, "[c]learly established law require[s
officers] to point to evidence" that suspects are both "armed and
23 5
dangerous."
Only in Robinson did the court discuss the dangerousness of
thefirearm, but the court's holding ultimately rested on the risk the individual
posed to the police.23 6
The "distinct approaches" of these courts to the firearms frisk question
reflects a growing tension with how and to what degree of invasiveness an
officer can police a heavily armed citizenry.23 7 On the one hand, the
"categorical approach" would find that "reasonable suspicion that a suspect
is armed is per se sufficient to conclude that the suspect is dangerous and to
conduct a frisk." 238 On the other hand, the "independent dangerousness
approach . . permits a frisk only if the suspect is deemed to be dangerous
based on factors other than mere weapons possession."239
It is also worth noting that all of these cases, as well as Orman and Serna,
involved firearms.240 What does this mean for Arizona's concealed knife
possessors? Should knives be treated just like firearms, even though virtually
any object, including a "wine bottle," can be made into a lethal weapon?24 1
Or should Arizona courts adopt a "modified categorical approach . .. [a]
firearms-only categorical approach" that authorizes automatic frisks of gun
carriers but not for other weapons carriers?242 The following section attempts
to answer some of these questions.

233. Id. at 704 ("[T]he officers reasonably believed that the person stopped 'was armed and
thus' dangerous."); cf id. at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining that "armed" and "dangerous"
are two separate prongs of a conjunctive test).
234. 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015).
235. Id. at 1132.
236. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 705 (emphasis added) (collecting cases observing the "inherently
violent nature of firearms," and concluding that "lawfully-stopped individuals armed with
firearms are categorically dangerous").
237. J. Richard Broughton, Danger at the Intersection of Second and Fourth, 54 IDAHo L.
REV. 379, 390 (2018) (summarizing "three distinct approaches" emerging from Robinson).
238. Id. (quoting Robinson, 846 F.3d at 695-702).
239. Id.
240. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 695 (describing investigatory stop initiated "[a]fter receiving a
tip that a man in a parking lot well known for drug-trafficking activity had just loaded a firearm");
Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1130 (recalling that the police encounter began after '[a] passing
motorcyclist stopped to complain about [Mr. Northrup's] visible firearm"); United States v.
Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007); State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 407 (Ariz. 2014).
241. United States v. Daulton, 488 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[C]ourts have held that a
wine bottle can be a dangerous weapon.").
242. Broughton, supra note 237, at 390.
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D. Policy Considerationsfor Guns andKnives
When carefully scrutinized, neither the "categorical" approach nor the
"independent dangerousness" approach pass muster as a matter of law or
policy. Particularly in a "constitutional carry" state like Arizona, where the
concealed carry of all types of weapons is legal and ubiquitous, a more
carefully tailored approach is needed to balance the rights of Arizonans to
remain armed in public with the obligation of Arizona law enforcement to
protect and serve.
The categorical approach ignores the wide array of circumstances in which
an individual can be "armed," particularly in a knife-friendly state like
Arizona. Terry states that an officer can conduct a protective frisk of a
lawfully stopped individual if the officer has "reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."243 Clearly, then, a
condition precedent to conducting a lawful frisk is the presence of a
weapon.24 4 If the individual is not "armed" (or at least if the officer lacks
reasonable suspicion that he is armed), then the circumstance do not justify a
frisk.24 5
But armed with what? As Justice Brennan noted in Wright v. New Jersey,
numerous everyday objects turn into "weapons" when put to appropriate use:
A "weapon" could include a brick, a baseball bat, a hammer, a
broken bottle, a fishing knife, barbed wire, a knitting needle, a
sharpened pencil, a riding crop, a jagged can, rope, a screw driver,
an ice pick, a tire iron, garden shears, a pitch fork, a shovel, a length
of chain, a penknife, a fork, metal pipe, a stick, etc. The foregoing
only illustrate the variety of lawful objects which are often
innocently possessed without wrongful intent.246
With this admonition in mind, the categorical approach seems untenable.
As Judge Wynn stated in his concurrence in Robinson, there is an "absurdity"
to automatically collapsing the "'armed and dangerous' test into a single
inquiry-regardless of the type of 'weapon' with which the detainee is
'armed.' 247 The categorical approach would authorize invasive frisks based
on a bright-line formula of forcible stop + weapon = danger, even if the two
inputs to that equation are seatbelt violation + sharpened pencil.
The "independent dangerousness" approach fares no better, however.24 8
While one might reasonably expect an officer to independently assess
243. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see Serna, 331 P.3d at 410.
244. See Serna, 331 P.3d at 410.
245. Id.

246. Wright v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1149 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 703 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting).
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whether a stopped suspect truly poses a danger with a pencil or a knitting
needle, supporters of the independent dangerousness approach invariably
invoke it with respect to the most inherently dangerous weapon of all:
firearms. For example, in her Robinson dissent, Judge Harris "[n]ot only . .
reject[s] a categorical approach, particularly one aimed at guns, she also
concludes that the proper Fourth Amendment approach is one that engages in
an independent inquiry into whether the suspect-even one carrying a gunis dangerous."249 According to Judge Harris, because "modern firearms law
has granted substantially more legal protection to citizens as gun owners,"
officers "no longer may take
for granted the same correlation between
2 50
'armed' and 'dangerous."'
This reasoning fails for two reasons. First, while expanding gun rights may
speak to the general law abidingness of gun owners generally, they do not
confer special protection to gun owners who have been lawfully stopped on
suspicion of criminal activity. Terry requires officers to have first developed
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before even reaching the
question of whether or not to frisk. Those lawfully stopped suspects fairly
lose the presumption of law abidingness. We should no longer take for
granted the same correlation between "armed" and "dangerous" for the
general Arizona population, but lawfully stopped Arizonans stand in a
separate, more suspicion category.
Second, even if expanding gun rights laws force us to reexamine the
correlation between an "armed individual" and a "dangerous individual," no
law can change the inherent dangerousness of the firearm itself. Courts have
repeatedly found that guns are uniquely and inherently dangerous.2 5 ' Federal
sentencing
guidelines
treat firearms as "inherently
dangerous
instrumentalities." Police officer and military training manuals stress the
inherent dangerousness of firearms. 2 52 Indeed, "[c]ommon sense tells us that
249. Broughton, supra note 237, at 389.
250. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting) ("I cannot endorse a rule that puts us
on a collision course with rights to gun possession rooted in the Second Amendment and conferred
by state legislatures.").
251. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., CITY OF CINCINNATI, THE CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE
MANUAL
§
12.550
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/department-references/policedepartment-procedure-manual/ [https://penna.cc/UD6D-SVBP] ("The authority to carry and use
firearms in the course of public service carries with it the highest level of responsibility."); N.J.

Div. OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICE TRAINING COMM'N, BASIC COURSE FIREARMS MANUAL

8, 15

(2009),
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/njptc/manuals/BasicCourseFirearmsManual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QK39-JN6B] (requiring that "relevant safety shall be maintained by keeping all
firearms' muzzles pointed towards the ground" and requiring all trainees to "describe the . .

lethal capabilities of the agency handgun(s) and shotgun(s)");
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guns are inherently dangerous; responsible gun owners treat them with great
care."2 53 Unlike baseball bats, broken bottles, and even knives and swords,
firearms exist for one reason only: to inflict lethal damage to a target. They
create an explosion to thrust a metal projectile at incredibly high velocities to
pierce and destroy objects. They have the capacity to inflict a wider range of
damage to a greater number of targets in a shorter amount of time than any
other weapon, including the most dangerous knives and swords.
Perhaps most importantly in this context, well over half of the 257 Arizona
police officers who have been killed in the line of duty were killed by
gunfire.2 54 One hundred forty-six Arizona officers have been killed in the line
of duty by a firearm; the next closest type of death (automobile crash) claimed
only twenty-five lives.255 Exactly four Arizona officers have lost their lives
on duty from stab wounds.25 6
For these reasons, a modified categorical approach authorizing automatic
frisks of firearms carriers only appears to best balance the rights of armed
Arizonans with the needs and safety of officers and the surrounding
community. On the one hand, armed Arizonans can freely carry concealed
firearms in public without fear of unnecessary scrutiny by law enforcement,
unless they engage in suspicious behavior independent of firearms possession
sufficient to warrant an involuntarily detention. But once that detention
occurs, the presumption of law abidingness disappears, and the balance of
protection shifts to the officer and the immediately surrounding public to
neutralize any possible threat posed by a firearm in the hands of a lawfully
stopped suspect.
Such a "firearms exception" to Fourth Amendment search law necessarily
means that knives, no matter how dangerous, would be subject to an
independent dangerousness inquiry. One might find this approach strange,
given the destructive potential of exotic blades like swords and the fact that
federal sentencing guidelines include "knives" in the definition of inherently
dangerous instrumentalities. But the simple reality is that knives do not carry
the immediate destructive power of firearms, nor do they have the range of
potential lethality that handguns and semi-automatic weapons carry.
DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY STANDARDS AND TRAINING, POLICE OFFICER FIELD TRAINING MANUAL 22,

28 (2013), https://www.ci.medford.or.us/files/Police%/`2OField%/`20Training%/o2OManual%/`20614-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4CP-F3GY].
253. Ezellv. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 714 (7th Cir. 2011).
254. Arizona

Line

of

Duty

Deaths,

OFFICER

DowN

MEMORIAL,

http://www.odmp.org/search/browse/AZ [https://penna.cc/4LF6-LT78] (last visited Mar. 17,
2019).
255. Id.
256. Id.
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Therefore, while recognizing the inherent dangerousness of the firearm and
its destructive power may counsel in favor of an automatic frisk, the same
argument does not necessarily extend to knives.
Another way to conceptualize this "independent dangerousness" inquiry
approach is as a common tort law risk assessment. The Fourth Amendment,
as interpreted by Terry and its progeny, require officers to make a fact-based
determination about a suspect's potential dangerousness.2 57 This inexact
science, conducted in a short timeframe under often tense conditions,
essentially requires officers to assess the amount of risk a suspect poses and
determine whether that risk requires the precaution of a search.2 58 Put another
way, does the probability of harm (P) caused by the armed suspect combined
with the potential magnitude of that harm (L) justify the taking of the
precaution (B) of a protective frisk?2 59
As with all officer-suspect encounters, the inputs in each circumstance will
be highly fact- and context-specific. But in a lawfully, heavily armed state
like Arizona, the default probability that an armed Arizonan will harm a
police officer should be low. Of course, that probability may increase for
lawfully stopped individuals suspected of criminal behavior, and may
increase dramatically if the individual is suspected of a violent crime as
compared to a minor traffic violation.
The input that will change most significantly based solely on the type of
"weapon" at issue is the magnitude of harm variable. Even if two Arizonans
are lawfully stopped on the same street on suspicion of jaywalking and pose
equally low danger profiles, the one armed with a handgun inherently poses
a far greater and more immediate danger to the officer and the surrounding
public than does the one armed with a switchblade. Thus, this risk assessment
approach to Terry frisks further confirms the reasonableness of a modified
categorical approach for firearms and an individualized assessment approach
for all other weapons, including knives.

257. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 28 (1968).
258. See Braswell v. McCamman, 256 F. Supp. 3d 719, 724 (W.D. Mich. 2017) ("[Police]
[o]fficers who put themselves in danger to keep our communities safe 'are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."'
(quoting Grahamv. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989))).
259. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]f the
probability [of an accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions]
B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [<] PL."); see
also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable
Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REv. 813, 816-25 (2001) (discussing the contours
and limits of the Hand Formula and related risk-assessment metrics).
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CONCLUSION

Like much of the country, Arizona has chosen to significantly expand gun
and other weapon possession rights in the public square. Not surprisingly, the
number of Arizonans carrying weapons in public has significantly increased
as a result. Whether this widespread open and concealed carry of weapons
makes Arizonans safer is a matter of significant empirical debate. Whether
public carry of firearms is protected by the Arizona Constitution or United
States Constitution remains an unresolved legal issue. But it is indisputable
that the arming of Arizona has complicated the job of Arizona's law
enforcement and fundamentally changed the legal standards governing police
authority to conduct a stop and frisk.
The foregoing discussion highlights the need for Arizona's police officers
to recognize that public possession of a firearm or other weapon, standing
alone, no longer satisfies the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable suspicion"
standard. The legalization of public carry has eliminated any viable argument
that weapons possession by itself implicates criminal activity. Moreover, as
the Arizona Supreme Court correctly concluded in State v. Serna, the absence
of such suspicion precludes the lawful frisking or disarming of an individual
carrying weapons in public purely out of concern for public safety. This
increased zone of protection for armed Arizonans from involuntary police
interaction changes over half a century of "stop and frisk" practice and
jurisprudence and requires a recalculation of risk assessment and reasonable
suspicion.
But this zone of protection fades once an armed Arizonan reasonably falls
under suspicion of criminal activity. At that point, no presumption of law
abidingness remains and officers can and should take all necessary
precautions to protect themselves and the surrounding public. In the case of
firearms possession, risk assessment principles require an automatic frisk and
disarmament when doing so is practicable and enhances safety. For other
weapons, including bladed weapons uniquely protected in Arizona, officers
should carefully assess the utility of conducting a frisk in light of Terry's
narrow original goal of officer and public protection. This careful balancing
of Terry's two-pronged test-greater protections for armed Arizonans from
investigatory seizures but fewer protections from protective searches-both
accords with existing Fourth Amendment principles and balances the
expanding rights of armed civilians with the needs of officers protecting those
same civilians.

